The protests that engulfed South African universities in 2015 and 2016 revealed a dissatisfaction by students with regard to higher education fees. This article looks at some of the lessons that could assist South Africa in understanding the role of universal fee-free higher education or fee-free higher education for the poor. Most countries in the post-colonial global South indicate a shift to cost-sharing as mounting financial pressures on state budgets make universal free education unsustainable. The current study shows that the cost-sharing model in South Africa has not resonated with students and may also be exclusionary to poor students. The lessons from the post-colonial global South show that the trend in higher education is that the poor are often left out of most fee structures -including dual track, universal fee-free, and cost-sharing models. The current study explores some implications and considerations of the current means test model that has been introduced by the current South African president, while using the global South as reference point for the implications of this fee structure, particularly in relation to poor and working-class students.
Introduction
South Africa's achievement of a democratic dispensation in 1994 meant all South Africans could have equal participation in the country's governance choice and saw the doors of all higher education institutions being opened for everyone, regardless of race or gender. By the time South Africa had to some extent freed itself from the subjugation of the minority population, most African countries had achieved independence from colonial rule, and had begun engaging with the difficult questions of nation building, and higher education became a focal point of how to achieve this.
Towards the end of 2015, the South African university landscape saw a number of student-led protests that demanded fee-free higher education (Mbembe, 2016; Pillay, 2015) . However, it is worth noting that the demands made by students were not limited to fee-free education as there was a resurgence in the demand for a decolonised higher education system (Mbembe, 2016; Pillay, 2015) . The movement that would come to be known as #FeesMustFall (#FMF) effectively used social media to galvanise support and was intertwined with #RhodesMustFall (University of Cape Town), #OpenStellenbosch (Stellenbosch University), Black Student Movement ([University Currently Known as] Rhodes University) and a host of other movements through which students' sought to transform particularly historically white institutions (Hodes, 2016) .
The #FMF student movement showed some variation with regard to what fee-free education would entail in the South African higher education sector. In this regard, institutions such as the University of Johannesburg (UJ), University of Pretoria (UP), Durban University of Technology (DUT), University of the Western Cape (UWC), and Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) all called for free education (Moosa, 2016) . The University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) students called for universal free education, while at the (University Currently Known as) Rhodes University students called for free education for the poor and the "missing middle", i.e. those students whose parents earn a combined family income of R123 000 up to R600 000 (Moosa, 2016) . In general, the students appeared to have made the decision that fee-free higher education is an important aspect of higher education provision that is fair and equitable (Naicker, 2016) .
The #FMF movement's demands of fee-free education were not met by then president Jacob Zuma as he only conceded to a 0% fee hike for the 2016 academic year (Naicker, 2016) . He established the Fees Commission under the auspices of the Department of Justice (DoJ) in January of 2016 to investigate how higher education could be funded going forward . The commission was set to conclude its work in eight months; however, by the time the second round of protests began in 2016, it was largely on the basis that universities were set to increase fees in the 2017 academic year, and the commission had not concluded its work (Department of Higher Education and Training [DHET], 2016). The state announced through the Minister of Higher Education and Training that there would be no fee increase for those whose families have a combined income of R122 000 and below, while those identified as the "missing middle" would also not incur a fee increase as the state would cover the shortfall (DHET, 2016) .
The demands made by students reflect democratic South Africa's struggle to alleviate poverty and create an environment conducive to sustainable development. For the majority of the country's population, obtaining a university degree does not only mean better job opportunities but also a drastic shift in social mobility for an entire generation. The importance of an educated society cannot be overstated, particularly in South Africa with its recent history of subjugation and intentional underdevelopment of the large majority of the people. According to Albach, Reisberg and Rumbley (2009) , higher education has been recognised globally as a means for people to access higher-paying work, and as an important economic driver. Additionally, Bloom, Canning and Chan (2006) have argued that investing in higher education for any society has a direct impact on economic growth (see also Kapur, & Crowley, 2008) .
The Fees Commission released an interim report towards the full report in 2017, after handing the report to the president. The Fees Commission had a number of recommendations, most notably that students from poor and working-class families be given Income Contingent Loans through private banks that would be guaranteed by the state (DoJ, 2017) . The Presidency announced that in the university sector poor and working-class students would be considered as families with an annual combined income of R350 000 and below, and these students would therefore receive fully subsidised higher education including accommodation, study material and transport costs, while those who are above this new threshold up to R600 000 would incur no fee increase as the state would again, for the academic year 2018, provide for payment of the shortfall (The Presidency, 2017) . This is a fundamental change in the higher education landscape and surely meets the demands made by students from the 2015 and 2016 protests.
This article deals with the issue of free education and how this may have an impact on the structure of higher education and, by extension, society, with regard to the class distributions. The focus is on what lessons can be learnt from other post-colonial countries. Given the legacy of apartheid and colonialism in South Africa it is imperative that we ask: How does South Africa reshape the higher education landscape to be more inclusive of both class and race? Are there lessons to be learnt from other post-colonial countries? Does fee-free higher education allow greater access for the poor and working classes or is the trend towards higher education to remain the privilege of the middle to upper classes? These are important questions to ask in an attempt to democratise higher education and include those who are often left in the margins of a modernising society.
The South African Condition
Due to South Africa' s racialised past, it is important to keep in mind the role that class plays in racial disparities and the role that race plays in creating class disparities (Young & Braziel, 2006) . Mbeki and Mbeki (2015) highlight that there is a growing class issue, particularly between those at the top of the economic strata and those at the bottom, that may not necessarily be race based. It is, however, still the case that class cannot be spoken about without speaking about race.
South Africa is rated amongst the most unequal societies out of 120 countries in the world using the Gini Coefficient 1 (The World Bank, 2017). Mbeki and Mbeki (2016) demonstrate that a large proportion of South Africa's population lives in dire poverty. Estimated at 23.6 million people, they have termed this category the "underclass". They note that the underclass is largely occupied by black people, while the white population group lives mostly in the middle and upper economic strata, though the top one percent of South African society is mixed in terms of racial demographics (Mbeki & Mbeki, 2016) . These numbers are not new in the South African public domain as the former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, argued in what has come to be known as the 'Two Worlds' speech (Mbeki, 1998) . Amongst the things the former president was referring to was the South African economic divide which was (is) based on race, with the white minority having the lion's share of the country's wealth, while the black majority live in dire poverty (Mbeki, 1998) . This assertion was not without dispute as Nattrass and Seekings (2001) proposed that the South African socioeconomic landscape was not highly skewed in favour of the white minority. However, the position of this article is such that the inequalities of South African society have persisted well into the 24-year-old democracy and are very evident even in higher education.
According to the DHET (2015) , in 2013 the African population group made up 68% of all students registered in contact universities; however, the DHET does not make a case for the socioeconomic status of the African students. This leaves the question of the socioeconomic background of the students being unknown or, worse yet, the unverified assumption is that a large proportion of these students come from low socioeconomic backgrounds. The conflation of socioeconomic status and race often leads to false conclusions about the class struggle in South African society. Amongst these is the idea that a much greater number of the people on the lower end of the socioeconomic strata are gaining access to the higher education system, particularly university education, than may be the case.
The 2016 General Household Survey (Statistics South Africa [StatsSA], 2017, p. 17) indicated that the participation rates in higher education amongst African and coloured population groups (aged 18 to 29 years) were the lowest with 3.3% and 3.5% respectively, compared to the participation rates of Indian (18.8%) and white (17.5%) population groups. The low participation rates of African and coloured population groups are concerning as these groups are most affected by poverty and deprivation (StatsSA, 2012; Mbeki & Mbeki, 2016) . Although the African population groups may have the highest numbers with regard to people within the higher education sector, this appears to be a disproportionate representation. Additionally, while the evidence presented by StatsSA (2017) offers much about race participation, the question of class remains unanswered.
A recent study conducted at a historically white university (HWU) on factors affecting academic performance included an array of factors such as race, class, age, gender, previous type of high school, social capital, locus of control, well-being, international status, language, and frequency of lecture attendance, noted an interesting trend between race and class (Dlamini, 2016) . The research did not intend to highlight participation with regard to race and class. However, many of the participants indicated that they came from homes that fall within the middle to upper strata of South African society with regard to family income and the type of high school they had attended, which were mostly former Model C and private schools (Dlamini, 2016) . If we consider the results of DHET (2015) and the study by Letseka, Breier and Visser (2010) , the African population group makes up a larger proportion of the students enrolled in the university system (66.4%), although they constitute the smallest relative to the population size (StatsSA, 2017, p. 16) . There thus appears to be a disproportionate participation rate with regard to the economic class within the sector.
To fund students coming from lower-income homes, the state created the National Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) (NSFAS Act No. 56, 1999) . NSFAS is a loan that is provided to students who come from households where the combined family income is less than R122 000 per year. The final year of the loan can be converted into a bursary provided the student finishes their degree in the requisite time; however, the rest must be paid back to the state (DHET, 2015) . The increase in the student numbers in the early years of the millennium saw NSFAS come under pressure to fund more students. However, the NSFAS budget has increased substantially between the time the scheme was introduced in 1999 and the 2015 academic year, from a budget of R441 million in 1999 to R9 billion in the 2015 academic year (NSFAS, 2015) . NSFAS report (2015 indicates that the government scheme had funded 42% of students in the higher education system, though this number was inclusive of students in Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) colleges and could be significantly lower if only universities are considered. According to the Centre for Higher Education (CHE, 2016) , in 2011, NSFAS funded 31% of students, and 24% of the students in the year 2013 in the country's universities. The authors can only speculate that the marked decrease can be attributed to the increase in the university fees and an increase of the student numbers -although the effect of the latter can be considered to be minimal.
The recent announcement by the Presidency on the structure of university fees included a restructuring of NSFAS. The Presidency outlined that all students currently registered at a university and whose fees are being paid for through NSFAS will be given grants rather than the current loan system (The Presidency, 2017). In line with this announcement is that education will be fee-free for those at TVET colleges, while those who are classified as working class or poor will also not pay for university education. What remains to be seen is the effects this will have for students who are accessing higher education for the first time starting in 2018, that is to say whether class disparities will be alleviated within the higher education sector.
The protests that engulfed the South African higher education sector in 2015 and continued, to an extent, in 2016, indicated that students were unhappy with the state funding in higher education (Naicker, 2016; Hodes, 2016; Motlalepule & Smith, 2017) . They also indicated that even though NSFAS has had a fundamental role in allowing those who were previously marginalised to attend higher education institutions, and particularly universities, students still felt that there was more that could be done, as evidenced by the protests in 2015 and 2016. The issue of the majority of African students' participation in the higher education sector has been a point of focus because of the country's history of racial division which resulted in the majority of the country's population being left out of the formal economy (Seedat, 1998; Mbeki, 1998) . It is important to note that in as much as university participation is a matter of redressing the injustices of the past that have left a legacy of a racialised economy (Mbeki, 1998) and higher education sector, issues of class participation need careful monitoring as they may create two worlds in South African society.
Further, South African democracy is fairly young if looked at in terms of participation for all who live in it, and the current article posits that there are valuable lessons that can be learnt from other post-colonial countries that have grappled with the issue of an inclusive economy. Failures and successes in this regard offer an important way to shape the higher education sector, particularly with the demands for free universal or free education for the poor -that are made by students in universities (Moosa, 2016) . These lessons can offer a way to understand some of the implications that such a system can have in the higher education sector, particularly for the millions of South Africans living in poverty, and whose hopes for a better future rest with the children who may have access to a university education.
Post-colonial Trends in Higher Education
Universal fee-free education
The issue of access to higher institutions of learning for the poor in the post-colonial world is one that has become a point of contention. Bloom et al. (2006) argue that there is a clear link between a country's economic development and a well-functioning higher education sector. Mamdani (2008) argues that higher education is an important sector as it is where teachers are trained, where curricula are developed, and where the leaders of a society are cultivated. For instance, the colonial period did not yield the number of graduates required for the newly independent countries to be able to function at optimal level (Mamdani, 2008; Teferra & Albach, 2004) . As such, the post-colonies carry the enormous challenge to reverse the effects of colonisation and offer people in those countries opportunities for a better life. Cloete (2015) makes the point that "free higher education sounds revolutionary … but in a developing country it is financially, empirically and morally wrong" (p. 11). This argument is based on the idea that in a post-colonial country such as South Africa, the rich are often the beneficiaries of a universally free higher education system. This article postulates that the current fee-based higher education system is not only benefiting the upper class and the middle class, but a higher education system that is universally fee-free will only serve to entrench this further. As Cloete (2015) puts it "for the rich, higher education in South Africa is a bargain, for the gifted poor it is affordable through financial aid …" (p. 11). Oketch (2003) argues that the calls for tuition-free higher education in countries such as Kenya, Uganda and Zambia were based on the notion that tuition is prohibitive to those who cannot afford higher education, which led to protests by students in the 1990s for higher education to be tuition free. South Africa has had to deal with the same kind of protests in 2015; as noted earlier, students have made similar arguments with regard to fee-free higher education in South Africa (Moosa, 2016) . The idea that the current model is exclusionary has taken hold in South Africa and, as demonstrated by the results of Dlamini (2016) at a HWU, this may well be true. However, it does not appear that a tuition-free higher education system will have the benefits of equality that the students are seeking (Oketch, 2003) .
The benefits of a fee-free education may not accrue to the poor and working class as can be seen in the case of Brazil, which has universal free education for its student population (Brotman & Pollack, 2017; Johnstone, 2004) . However, this has not lead to equitable participation of the classes in higher education. Kapur and Crowley (2008) indicate that in Brazil 65% of the students attended private basic education and a more indicative statistic is that 66% of the student population come from the top 20% of the socioeconomic strata. This indicates that a universally fee-free education serves to benefit those who come from the upper economic strata of society, and who then have the upper hand in entering higher education. In this way public universities become a space to reproduce privilege by giving access to the valuable resource of university degrees to those who already occupy a privileged position in society.
Cost-sharing
According to Johnstone (2004) , a number of countries have introduced some kind of cost-sharing that is "a shift of the higher educational cost burden from exclusive or nearexclusive reliance on government, or taxpayers, to some financial reliance upon parents and/or students …" (pp. 403-404). Mamdani (2008) notes that it was The World Bank that urged the post-colonial countries, particularly those in Africa, to move towards a cost-sharing model as higher education was seen as a private good in comparison to basic education which was seen as a public good (see also Oketch, 2003) . The private versus public good debate is a problematic one as the distinction is arbitrary and seeks to create a binary where none exists. This is to say that there is both a private and public good in higher education as the individual who gains a university degree is able to access higher paying jobs, resulting in taxes from which the public also benefits.
In other post-colonial countries such as Uganda and Tanzania the cost-sharing model that has been used is the dual-track system, which means having fee-free institutions and having privately sponsored students (Ishengoma, 2004; Marcucci, Johnstone & Ngolovoi, 2008) . Marcucci et al. (2008) argue that even though there is a dual-track system in these countries, there is still unequal access to higher education, particularly because of the stringent access requirements. As is the case in Brazil, most students who attend the universities in East Africa -which includes countries such as Kenya -come from private schools, while families who cannot afford a private education have no option but to place their children in dysfunctional public schools and, as a result, access has been in favour of those in the upper strata of the socioeconomic ladder (see Kapur & Crowley, 2008; Marcucci et al., 2008) . What this highlights is a concern that even though higher education is fee-free for the majority of students, because the public basic education system in those countries does not ensure student success in entering higher education, the result has been that those who can afford the fees for private basic education are still populating the higher education space (Kapur & Crowley, 2008; Marcucci et al., 2008) .
Further, according to Kapur and Crowley (2008) , in Asian countries such as China and India where university education is state funded, there is heavy regulation that seeks to limit the expenditure on universities. However, the imposed regulations have also had an effect on the quality of education provided and decreasing academic freedom. Institutional autonomy is a vital part of many academic institutions that operate at optimal level around the world. In South Africa, the state has allowed institutions autonomy to choose their pedagogical and research direction, and even set the fee scale according to the needs of each institution (CHE, 2016) . What is concerning, however, are the disruptions in keeping the higher education sector financially viable, which often have negative consequences for achieving these research objectives as seen in places such as Uganda (see Mamdani, 2008; Bloom & Canning, 2006) . The reduction of research outputs from sub-Saharan Africa -with the exception of South Africa -and the rest of the developing world is of particular concern, and the government of South Africa, along with the higher education sector as a whole, recognises this component.
Most post-colonial countries have faced the challenge of being unable to achieve the desired goal of equitable access through cost-sharing methods. Rather cost-sharing appeared to entrench the inequalities, with a further effect on teaching and learning within higher education institutions (Mamdani, 2008) . The same can be seen in the costsharing method that South Africa was using up until 2017 as it was not achieving the goal of class access and, to an extent, the goal of racial demographic access (StatsSA, 2017; Dlamini, 2016) . Although cost-sharing appears to make a case for the fact that higher education is both a public and private good, what this kind of structure fails to recognise is the problematic manner in which cost-sharing often excludes those who cannot afford university fees. In South Africa, it must be said, NSFAS, has to some degree been able to mitigate this. However, other challenges faced by students who come from working-class and poor families, including transportation, food and accommodation, have resulted in a high dropout rate amongst these students. Intergenerational poverty often results in students having to leave, particularly contact universities, so that they may be able to provide financial support to families. Cost-sharing appears on the face of it to allow equal access for everyone in a society; however, the result is often that there is an undue burden placed on individual families whose circumstances are affected by the history of the systematic racism of apartheid and colonialism.
The call for free education by South African students can be seen as a move in the opposite direction of most African countries. While other countries are looking at costsharing, South African students are calling for fee-free education. South Africa, upon achieving democracy in 1994, had already had a cost-sharing method whereby the government subsidised students but students in higher education were (are) required to pay a fee. The South African government's current role is mainly in issuing what is known as 'block grant' funding that differentiates teaching input (enrolments), teaching output (graduation rates), research output (advanced postgraduate research degree graduates, and publications by staff and students) and lastly institutional factors (based on size and proportion of students from historically disadvantaged populations) and so-called 'earmarked' funds (CHE, 2016) . It can be argued that the South African government views the higher education system as both a private and public good, through which cost-sharing mechanisms have been maintained.
Following the protests in 2015, the then Minister of Higher Education and Training in South Africa, Blade Nzimande, maintained that the state was "committed to progressively realise free post-school education for the poor and the working class … and to assist middle-class families who are unable to pay" (DHET, 2016, p. 1 ). It appears that the state at this point was leaning towards a system in which the poor and the working class could have fee-free education while the middle and upper class would engage in some kind of cost-sharing. The announcement by the Presidency in December of 2017 was in line with the commitment made by the minister two years prior, as higher education will be free for those coming from poor and working-class backgrounds, while those who come from the middle to upper classes will contribute in a cost-sharing method (The Presidency, 2017).
Future Considerations for South Africa
The current analysis of some of the trends in the global South indicates what Cloete (2015) points to about universal fee-free education being more beneficial to the economic elite than it is to the poor and the working class. However, the trends also indicate that costsharing mechanisms are not the solution that they may appear to serve, specifically to the poor and working class, as cost-sharing often means that the individual student must be in an economic position to pay for fees. It is clear that the introduction of fee-free higher education in South Africa must be carefully monitored in order to ensure that there is an increase in the number of students from poor and working-class families who access university education.
The introduction of a holistic funding system can serve as a deterrent for the high attrition rates amongst working-class and poor students. It is important to note here what Oketch (2003) argues about students in countries such as Zambia, Uganda and Kenya who tend to stay longer in the education system when a holistic funding system is introduced. The issues of throughput are well documented in South Africa as being a result of a multitude of factors acting against students who come from working-class and poor families. Some of these include student well-being (Young & Campbell, 2014) , institutional culture (Matthews, 2015) and even first-generation status (Hlatshwayo, 2016) , which all intersect to produce low throughput rates.
The issue of attrition, however, serves as a vital point when holistic support is considered with studies showing that students either do not finish their degrees in the required time frame or drop out completely, leaving university without acquiring even the basic degree (Letseka et al., 2010) . It is in issues of attrition and throughput that studies investigating the reasons for this high attrition rate should become an imperative for the sector with regard to funding, as they can better illuminate the challenges faced by students. It is worth noting, however, that existing literature in this field, such as the landmark study by Letseka et al. (2010) , shows that those students who come from poor and working-class families are the hardest impacted by attrition rates for a variety of reasons such as those that were investigated by Dlamini (2016) .
Given that the financial constraints can be mitigated by means of fee-free education, what still bears mentioning here are the effects of the basic education system on access and success. Even though students from working-class families can apply for a state grant and not pay fees for university in other post-colonial countries such as Brazil and Uganda, students who come from private basic education still are the beneficiaries (Kapur & Crowley, 2008; Oketch, 2003) . The difference in South Africa is that fee-free higher education is based on a means test; however, this does not mean that those from the lower economic strata are going to populate universities, as one of the most important requirements is still grade 12 results. It is in this way highly important that the inequalities in the quality of basic education are fast eradicated to ensure that the inequalities in higher education are not further entrenched.
At this point in the country's policy development, it has become necessary that research focusing on attrition and throughput influences the direction that the higher education system takes. Mamdani (2008) notes that higher education is a great public good when it is applied in this way. Stated differently, higher education is not just a place where people can gain skills that ensure social mobility, but the research that is produced in academic spaces can and should influence the country's policy in some form. It is worth repeating that the climate in which students do not complete their degrees on time will put a heavy burden on an already overly extended fiscus, in which the state has other competing social problems such as the social grants that are now being provided to over 17 million people. South Africa's slow economic growth and low employment rate can result in the inability of the state to shoulder financial responsibility for the higher education sector. This conundrum is seen in other post-colonial countries, as noted by Oketch (2003) and Johnstone (2004) , and may very well become a South African reality. Mayanja (1998) argues that the state should remain the primary funder of the higher education system in Uganda. However, there should be increased sensitivity to equality, with an element of positive discrimination. For South Africa it is important that we take cognisance of the concerns raised by Mamdani (2008) , Johnstone (2004) and Kapur and Crowley (2008) about post-colonial states' capacity to maintain the costs of higher education.
Another alternative to consider in the future should South Africa not be able to maintain free education is what has been implemented in Scotland -although not necessarily a former colony. The country has done away with upfront fees to higher education and instead has introduced the Scottish Endowment Fund, wherein former students contribute in the form of taxes to the sustainability of the system (Johnstone, 2004) . There are concerns with this as it puts an increased burden on the young black graduate who often has to pay the current income-based tax and living expenses while supporting unemployed (and underemployed) family members (Mbeki & Mbeki, 2016) . This has been a criticism with regard to NSFAS repayment, which takes into consideration affordability but is often an expense that such a graduate cannot afford in real terms. For this reason -and also lack of employment opportunities -NSFAS repayment has been rather slow (NSFAS, 2015) .
Conclusions
South Africa is in a unique position in that it can learn from other post-colonial countries with regard to what to do with the resource of higher education. The developmental agenda that South Africa is currently engaged in does not exclude an effective higher education system. There are matters that appear to have more pressing urgency than that of higher education, and this is not unique to South Africa (see Johnstone, 2004; Kajubi, 1992; Mamdani, 2008; Oketch, 2003) .
This article has focused on whether there could be lessons learnt from other post-colonial countries on the issue of fees in higher education. The trend in the global South has been to move from no fees to some fees being charged for obtaining a higher education qualification; this has been largely due to constraints on financial resources (Kapur & Crowley; Oketch, 2003; Kajubi, 1992; Mayanja, 1998) . Equality with regard to socioeconomic class has appeared an elusive concept in higher education institutions in the post-colony, and in South Africa the conflation of race and class has also proven to make this goal even more difficult to attain. It is important that we highlight the racial disparities in higher education if we are to properly redress the challenges currently facing the country. However, in so doing, we cannot create a classist society.
The 'Two Worlds' that former president Thabo Mbeki spoke about will be maintained if the country does not take into consideration issues of positive discrimination with regard to not only race but also class. The understanding that higher education offers an opportunity for class mobility in a world where knowledge and skills are increasingly valuable should be paramount in the analysis of higher education (Johnstone, 2004; Teferra & Albach, 2004) .
